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Did the Job Ladder Fail after
the Great Recession?
Giuseppe Moscarini, Yale University and National Bureau
of Economic Research
Fabien Postel-Vinay, University College London
and Sciences Po, Paris
We study employment reallocation across employers through the
lens of a dynamic job ladder model. Workers always agree on a
ranking of employers at all points in time and search for better jobs
both off and on the job. A parsimonious version of the model fits
well the time series of gross worker flows by employer size from
newly available US data from the Job Openings and Labor Turn-
over Survey. Focusing on the US experience in and around the
Great Recession, our evidence indicates that the job ladder stopped
working then and has not fully resumed yet.
I. Introduction
The persistence of high unemployment in the United States and in
many other countries after the 2007–9 Great Recession is currently the
central issue for macroeconomic policy around the world. In previous
work ðMoscarini and Postel-Vinay 2009, 2012, 2013Þ, we document em-
pirically and formulate a hypothesis to explain the pattern of employment
decline and recovery during and after a typical recession. In a nutshell, in a
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tight labor market, high-paying large employers overcome the scarcity of
unemployed job applicants by poaching employees from smaller, less pro-
ductive, and lower-paying competitors, whose employment share then
shrinks in relative terms. When the expansion ends, large employers that
were less constrained have more employment to shed than small ones. In
addition, rising unemployment relaxes hiring constraints on all employ-
ers, particularly the small ones that are less capable of poaching from other
firms. As a result, small employers downsize less in the recession and grow
faster ðstill in relative termsÞ in the early recovery. According to this hy-
pothesis, in a prolonged phase of high unemployment, as we witnessed
since 2009, small firms should be leading the charge in job creation, fol-
lowed years later by upgrading to larger, better-paying employers.
We call this hypothesis a “dynamic job ladder.” The idea of a stationary
job ladder, a uniform ranking of jobs by all workers, who climb it slowly
via job-to-job quits while occasionally falling off it, is well established in
the literature. Our previous work introduced a business cycle dimension
to this hypothesis on worker turnover. In this paper, we confront this
hypothesis with more demanding empirical tests. We still adopt employer
size as an empirical measure of the job ladder “rung” based on the simple
fact that employers higher up in a ladder tend to be larger, as they attract
and retain more employment, and also based on the observed wage/size
relationship. We go beyond the net worker flows by size that we studied
in our previous work and here consider also the model’s implications for
gross worker flows ðhires, quits, and layoffsÞ and vacancy postings by
employer size. These times series have been recently made available by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey
ðJOLTSÞ program. Specifically, we calibrate the key turnover equations
implied by a generic dynamic job ladder model to fit the monthly time
series of net and gross employment flows by employer size. We extend
our investigation to examine the Great Recession and its aftermath in com-
parison with previous cyclical episodes.
We reach the following conclusions. First, the dynamic job ladder
model, a parsimonious setup built on some very strong assumptions, such
as homogeneous labor and time-invariant rank of each employer in the lad-
der, does a remarkable job at fitting the dynamics of employment across size
classes. The estimated hiring intensity by employer size resembles vacancies
seminars and conference presentations. Special thanks to Charlotte Oslund at the
Bureau of Labor Statistics ðBLSÞ for extensive assistance with JOLTS data. Mos-
carini also thanks theNational Science Foundation for support to his research under
grant SES 1123021. The usual disclaimer applies. Information concerning access to
the data used in this article is available as supplementarymaterial online. Contact the
corresponding author, Giuseppe Moscarini, at giuseppe.moscarini@yale.edu.
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by establishment size measured in JOLTS, but it resolves some puzzling as-
pects of these data, specifically the lack of vacancies at the small-employer
end. Second, a comprehensive assessment of the evidence indicates that move-
ments up the job ladder have slowed down considerably since the Great
Recession. The drastic decline in labor market turnover affected especially
direct movements from smaller, lower-paying to larger, higher-paying em-
ployers. Small employers suffered unusual job losses, relative to large em-
ployers and to a typical recession, mostly through an increase in their lay-
offs, which were only partially compensated for by resilient vacancy posting
and hiring.
Further support to our dynamic job ladder hypothesis has been re-
cently offered by Kahn and McEntarfer ð2014Þ, who exploit the matched
employer-employeemicrodata from theLongitudinal Employer-Household
Dynamics at the US Census Bureau to isolate the firm component of wages
and to track worker turnover over the period 1998–2011 at quarterly fre-
quency. They find that high-paying firms grew faster during the aggre-
gate expansion of the 2000s and shrank more quickly in the 2001 and 2008
busts. Low-paying firms were less sensitive to the aggregate unemploy-
ment rate. Furthermore, this pattern was due entirely to reduced separa-
tions to other jobs during recessions: while low-paying firms cut hiring
more, their separations to other firms declined even more than at high-
paying employers.
We now provide details on our contributions. From an aggregate labor
market perspective, the Great Recession was no exception: job openings
went down across the board, job finding rates plummeted, and layoff rates
temporarily spiked, especially around the fall of 2008 when the financial
crisis erupted. As a result, unemployment soared. As we argued and doc-
umented in our previous work, which covered the four previous reces-
sions, this pattern created relatively favorable conditions for small, low-
paying, less productive employers. High unemployment meant that there
was plenty of cheap labor for them to hire. Vacancy yields soared as an
army of the newly unemployed lined up for few available jobs. The col-
lapse in aggregate job market tightness reduced not only the workers’ exit
rate from unemployment, as is well understood, but also the job-to-job
quit rate.
Evidence on job openings and gross worker flows from JOLTS, the
monthly Current Population Survey ðCPSÞ, and the Survey of Income and
Program Participation ðSIPPÞ largely corroborates this view. Job-to-job
transitions indeed went down markedly during the Great Recession. The
“poaching intensity” ðshare of new hires that originate from a job-to-job
transitionÞ declined sharply during and after the Great Recession, espe-
cially so for larger employers. Finally, while the share of small establish-
ments in total job openings remained roughly stable throughout the Great
Recession ðif anything, it went up a littleÞ, the vacancy yield of small
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employers sky-rocketed, in sharp contrast to the comparatively modest
ðand vanishingÞ increase in the vacancy yield of large establishments.
Yet—and this is where the Great Recession differs from previous re-
cessions—small employers fared worse than large ones in terms of net em-
ployment growth. This unusually poor job creation performance was the
result of a brutal ðtemporaryÞ increase in the layoff rate of small employers
around the Lehman Brothers episode ðSeptember 2008Þ, the peak of the
financial crisis. While at that point layoff rates rose sharply at employers
of all sizes, small establishments stood out, possibly because they were hit
especially hard by the credit crunch. Those among small employers that
were still hiring did so relatively easily and benefited from relatively fa-
vorable conditions on the hiring and retention margins.
These findings suggest the following interpretation of the Great Re-
cession and of its aftermath. Small employers, especially existing ones, faced
an unusual credit crunch that led to a wave of layoffs. To contrast this ef-
fect, the sharp increase in unemployment and relaxed hiring constraints
kept small employers hiring at a relatively healthy pace. The collapse in
hiring was concentrated among large employers and led to a deep freeze in
job-to-job upgrading and attrition up the job ladder, taming the incentives
of small employers to post vacancies and hire unemployed workers.
In Section II, we present descriptive evidence on labor market flows
across employers of different sizes before, during, and after the Great
Recession. In Section III, we present the turnover equations describing
the business cycle dynamics of gross and net workers flows in a dynamic
job ladder model. We also briefly discuss structural equilibrium founda-
tions for this process and relate it to the descriptive evidence. In Sec-
tion IV, we describe our methodology to calibrate turnover parameters
and hiring intensity by firm size in the dynamic job ladder model so that it
replicates the observed net and gross flows of employment by firm size.
In Section V we discuss our empirical results. Section VI presents our
conclusions.
II. The Dynamic Job Ladder: Descriptive Evidence
We examine the cyclical reallocation of employment among firms and
establishments, especially around the Great Recession, through the lens of
the job ladder, namely, the turnover process that occurs when all workers
agree on a ranking of employers and face frictions in finding and retaining
jobs. We begin with descriptive empirical evidence. In order to make the
notion of a job ladder empirically operational, we need a measure of a lad-
der’s “rung.” As workers move up the ladder, employers high on the lad-
der tend to accumulate more employment, thus to be larger. We focus on
an employer’s size as the main empirical counterpart of its position on the
job ladder because size is accurately and easily measurable in the data,
unlike other natural candidates such as productivity or compensation
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policy.1 We present new evidence on the cyclicality of four relevant types
of aggregate labor market statistics, all broken down by employer size: em-
ployment shares, net job creation, gross job flows ðhires, quits, and layoffsÞ,
and vacancy postings.
Before we proceed, an important caveat: we emphasize that in our anal-
ysis we focus on continuing employers and abstract from entry and exit.
The reason for this choice is threefold. First, and foremost, given our fo-
cus on cyclical employment variation, entry and exit play a relatively mi-
nor role. While they are extremely important to determine average job and
worker flows,2 their contribution to cyclical movements in aggregate em-
ployment is positive but modest: in the Business Employment Dynam-
ics ðBEDÞ,3 the standard deviation of the net job creation rate, passed
through a Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 1,600, equals
.48 for the whole economy and is just slightly lower, .435, for continuing
establishments, which exclude openings and closings.4 Second, the prime
novel data set that we employ in this paper, JOLTS by establishment size,
is a survey of preexisting establishments, where exit is by and large offset
by a monthly sample rotation/refreshment scheme, while entry does not
contribute to the observations. Third, the equations describing workers’
movement on a dynamic job ladder that we use for our calibration exercise
are much simpler when ignoring entry and exit, although both of them could
be accommodated in a limited sense.
To begin, we motivate our hypothesis that size is one relevant ðalbeit by
no means the only possibleÞ empirical counterpart of a job ladder rung.
In an appendix, available online, we provide corroborating empirical evi-
dence, drawing from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
ðQCEWÞ for establishments and from Statistics of US Businesses ðSUSBÞ,
an annual census of all employers, for firms.5 First, it has long been doc-
1 In the United States, information on sales at the firm level, necessary to com-
pute total factor productivity ðTFPÞ, is not available for a representative sample of
firms from all industries.
2 Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda ð2013Þ document from an annual longitu-
dinal census of US employers that in fact entrants create on average more jobs than
the whole economy, as continuing establishments and exits on net destroy jobs.
3 The BED is a collection of quarterly gross job flows published by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, currently covering 1992Q3–2013Q1 and nearly the entire US
private sector.
4 This way of measuring the contribution of entry is based on the extreme view
that, one quarter after entry, new establishments are similar to incumbent ones of
the same size. More generally, entrants may face a different growth process than
incumbents early in their life cycle; in this case, a cyclical decline in entry may have
long-run effects onaggregate job creation that are significantly larger than the small
immediate impact that we document here.
5 The QCEW is the primary source of information on businesses from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. It publishes a quarterly count of employment and wages reported
by establishment size, covering 98% of US jobs, both private and public sector, avail-
able at the county, metropolitan statistical area, state, and national levels by industry.
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umented that employer size correlates positively with wage rates, after
controlling for observable worker characteristics ðBrown and Medoff
1989Þ. We confirm that larger employers pay more. Second, as predicted
by the dynamic job ladder hypothesis, the share of employment at large
firms or establishments is procyclical: workers climb the job ladder faster
in tight labor markets, when they can make contact with employers at a
higher rate.
A. Worker Flows by Establishment Size
Our main focus in this paper is on business cycles and the resulting dy-
namic job ladder. In order to measure worker flows by employer size, we
need at least a modicum of longitudinal links on firms/establishments and
workers. JOLTS comprises about 16,000 establishments, a size-stratified
sample from the QCEW frame, surveyed every month according to a ro-
tating panel structure. JOLTS measures job openings, hires, layoffs, quits,
and other separations at the establishment level. Recently, the BLS pub-
lished this information also by size of the establishment, in one of six size
classes, with lower bounds equal to 1, 10, 50, 250, 1,000, and 5,000 em-
ployees. This data set is central to our exercise.
In JOLTS, an establishment is assigned to a size class according to the
maximum size it attained in the 12 months preceding its inclusion in the
sample, independently of how its size changes while it is part of the sam-
ple.6 So, within each survey year, we know that the identity, hence the size
quantiles of establishments in each size class, are fixed.7 In the analysis that
follows, we will aggregate the largest two size categories available in the
JOLTS sample ð1,000–4,999 and over 5,000 employeesÞ into one single cat-
egory ðover 1,000 employeesÞ. We do this for two main reasons. First, the
largest size cutoff in the QCEW sample described above is 1,000 employees.
As we get our shares of private sector establishment counts from QCEW,
we will need to merge information from QCEW and JOLTS, which con-
strains us to use size cutoffs that are available in both data sets. Second,
the 5,0001 category in JOLTS is very small ðit accounts for less than 2.5%
of total employment in the JOLTS sample and covers few establishmentsÞ,
and the data pertaining to this category are somewhat noisy. The loss of
6 JOLTS ðreÞsampling dates are December 2000, December 2003, February 2005,
March 2006, and every March until 2013. A new JOLTS sample is put in place in the
month following each resampling.
7 Because this size classification follows an “initial employment” criterion, it is
known to be subject to a mean reversion bias, creating the illusion of a negative
size-growth relationship in the presence of a transitory component to firm size.
This issue is likely to matter more in narrower size classes, at the bottom of the size
distribution, where establishment size is more volatile. We will return to this issue
when discussing size misclassification.
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information implied by our aggregation of the largest two size classes into
one is therefore arguably relatively minor.
Finally, and importantly, we should mention that JOLTS by size class
covers only the private sector, while aggregate JOLTS data cover also the
public sector, just like its QCEW frame. This is an important caveat for
the Great Recession, where the public sector played a disproportionate
role in first buffering employment losses and then dragging on the em-
ployment recovery.
1. Net Flows
The cyclicality of employment shares of the various size classes of em-
ployers in our data, presented in the online appendix, provides limited
information on the size of businesses that were most affected by the Great
Recession. Aswe discussed inMoscarini and Postel-Vinay ð2012Þ, to avoid
the so-called reclassification bias, we need to study business dynamics for
at least two consecutive periods among classes to which employers are as-
signed based on their initial size. We showed there that the annual growth
rate of employment at initially large ð> 1,000 employeesÞminus small ð< 50
employeesÞfirms in theUnited States is strongly negatively correlatedwith
unemployment in 1979–2010. Here we zoom in on the Great Recession
using higher-frequency monthly data updated to cover the post–Great Re-
cession recovery.8 Figure 1 repeats the exercise using JOLTS data by size
of the establishment ðthis is an important distinction towhichwewill return
laterÞ. The differential net job creation series in figure 1 follows a similar
pattern as in previous recessions, but in the Great Recession it peaks later,
in fact at the very end of the recession, than one would have expected based
on the evidence reported inMoscarini and Postel-Vinay ð2012Þ for previous
recessions. It thus appears that small establishments were hit especially hard
by the credit crunch.
2. Gross Flows
To examine in more detail the nature of these evolutions, we turn to
gross worker flows. This is a unique advantage of JOLTS and, to the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to document the behavior of these flows
by employer size around the Great Recession. By definition, net employ-
ment growth in JOLTS equals hires minus the sum of layoffs, quits, and
other separations ðsuch as retirementÞ. The latter category is small and fairly
acyclical; thus, we focus on hires, layoffs and quits. Figure 2 plots hire rates
ðnew accessions divided by employmentÞ by establishment size.
8 All the raw JOLTS series are smoothed using a 6-month moving average
around each point prior to calibration to remove the fairly large amount of high-
frequency noise in those series.
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Hire rates began to decline before the Great Recession. Surprisingly,
during the deepest phase of the financial crisis, following the Lehmann
Brothers episode, hire rates collapsed at the larger establishments and not
at the smaller ones; they even briefly spiked in the smaller class in late 2008
FIG. 1.—Differential employment growth between establishment size classes
ðsolid lineÞ and unemployment rate ðdashed lineÞ.
FIG. 2.—Hire rates by establishment size class
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to early 2009. Given that, in figure 1, smaller establishments fared worse in
terms of net employment growth, especially from the last quarter of 2008
on, it must be the case that their separations rose disproportionately and
more than compensated their brisker hiring pace. We in fact see in figure 3
that layoff rates rose sharply and temporarily, especially at small estab-
lishments. Although not immediately evident from the figure, the increase
in layoff rates was almost exactly proportional across all size classes. Be-
cause smaller establishments report higher layoff rates on average, the ab-
solute increase in layoff rates during the Great Recession was more pro-
nounced at the bottom of the size distribution.
The third gross worker flow available in JOLTS, the quit rate, is shown
in figure 4. This flow conflates quits to nonemployment and quits to other
employers. While quit rates fell markedly across the board both in 2001
and around 2008, the figure clearly suggests that the fall during the Great
Recession was less sharp for small establishments than for large ones.
This fact corroborates the hypothesis that the comparatively worse per-
formance of small establishments during the Great Recession was entirely
driven by a spike in layoff rates, as opposed to higher total quits or reduced
hiring, which actually worked in the opposite direction.
JOLTS, as a survey of employers, provides a meaningful distinction be-
tween layoffs and quits, but not between quits to ðor hires fromÞ nonem-
ployment, as opposed to ðfromÞ other jobs, a distinction that is crucial to
the job ladder. We supplement JOLTS with information on gross worker
FIG. 3.—Layoff rates by establishment size class
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flows from the monthly CPS. Specifically, we use the hazard rates of tran-
sition between Employment ðEÞ, Unemployment ðUÞ, andNonparticipa-
tion ðNÞ estimated by Fallick and Fleischman ð2004Þ from gross flows
ðusing monthly matched filesÞ, starting in January 1994 and updated by
the authors through May 2014. This series begins with the 1994 redesign
of the CPS, which introduced a question on the change of employer that
made it possible to measure the hazard and which greatly improved the
reliability of employment status and thus reduced margin error. Figure 5
plots the transition rate, or hazard. While it is clearly procyclical and dropped
significantly during the Great Recession, the most striking aspect is the
declining trend. Off that trend, the decline during the Great Recession
was not especially pronounced, and the recovery afterwardwas significant.
But in abolute terms, that is, without detrending, the EE hazard remains at
an all-time low almost 5 years into the post–Great Recession recovery. It is
well known that EE transitions include involuntary reallocation and other
events that reduce worker’s earnings ðour model explicitly accommodates
this possibility through reallocation shocks—see Sec. IIIÞ. Therefore, per se
they provide only limited information on the extent to which workers climb
the job ladder. It is, however, striking that the EE rate is the most lagging
labor market indicator post–Great Recession.
The CPS contains no information on the size of a worker’s employer.
For this, we turn to the SIPP, starting with the 1996 panel. We exploit the
FIG. 4.—Quit rates by establishment size class
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availability of the start date and the end date of each job to construct EE
transition rates by size of the hiring “workplace,” the phrasing in the SIPP
questionnaire that we interpret to be an establishment. In figure 6, we show
the share of all hires that originate directly from other employers, thus
entail an EE transition, broken down by size of the hiring establishment.
For readability, we aggregate size classes into two groups, separated by
the 100-employee cutoff. The interpretation of the cyclical patterns is
complicated by gaps in the time series, due both to genuine gaps between
SIPP panels and to our decision to discard the first 4 months and the last
3 months in each panel, when no rotation group has a “seam” between
interviews, leading to an underestimate of turnover rates. As predicted by
the job ladder model, larger establishments appear to always hire more
from other employers and less from nonemployment, especially late in ex-
pansions, when the market tightens and competition for workers grows
stiffer. In the Great Recession, this “poaching” inflow-share collapsed for
both size groups. Since total hires also declined sharply, this is the stron-
gest evidence that the climbing of the job ladder came to a grinding halt.
To take stock, we showed that net job creation by small establishments
was especially poor during the Great Recession, relative to larger estab-
lishments and to a typical US recession, and that this is due entirely to a
spike in their layoffs, while hires and total quits declined much less at the
FIG. 5.—Total employment-to-employment hazard
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bottom of the size distribution. Aggregate job-to-job transitions collapsed,
even more so toward larger establishments, and never recovered.
B. Vacancies by Establishment Size
We now return to JOLTS to describe the behavior of measured job
vacancies by size class. Vacancies are uniquely valuable as a direct measure
of labor demand, or intensity of hiring effort, as opposed to outcomes.
Figure 7 reports the time series of total job openings for each JOLTS size
class. Figure 8 further shows vacancy shares by size class, that is, vacan-
cies in each size class divided by total aggregate vacancies. If recorded job
openings are an accurate measure of hiring effort,9 then the series plotted
in figure 8 will represent the sampling probabilities of each size class.
Next, figure 9 shows vacancy shares divided by the number of estab-
lishment in each class from QCEW, normalized at one in January 2001 to
harmonize scales. We refer to those series as the vacancy weights by size
class. These weights measure average hiring effort per establishment in a
given size class, relative to aggregate hiring effort.
Figure 7 clearly shows that vacancies plummeted across the board dur-
ing the Great Recession, with vacancy levels seemingly tracking each other
across the various size classes. At first glance, figures 8 and 9 reinforce that
9 There are good reasons to believe that they are not, as we discuss below in
Sec. IV.
FIG. 6.—Share of hires from other employers, by employer size
S66 Moscarini/Postel-Vinay
This content downloaded from 128.041.035.146 on October 27, 2017 07:08:29 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
FIG. 7.—Vacancies by establishment size class
FIG. 8.—Vacancy shares by establishment size class
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impression, as the movements in vacancy shares and weights appear small
relative to the absolute decline seen in figure 7, which, to a first approxi-
mation, was uniform. On closer inspection, figures 8 and 9 further suggest
that there is no evidence of a disproportionate impact of the financial crisis
ðpost–September 2008Þ on the hiring effort of small establishments: the
movements are relatively modest, and the 10–49 employee class shows the
largest change, but upward. Overall, we conclude that hiring effort fell
proportionally at establishments of all sizes.
Finally, figure 10 plots the vacancy yield, namely, the ratio between
hires and vacancies reported a month before, by establishment size.10
Vacancy yields are countercyclical; specifically, during and after the Great
Recession, the aggregate yield rose enormously with unemployment du-
ration, and it became as easy for firms to fill vacancies as it was difficult
for the unemployed to find work. Importantly, figure 10 shows that this
FIG. 9.—Vacancy weights by establishment size class
10 Note that the yield is greater than one for many dates and size classes ðfig. 10Þ,
suggesting that the JOLTS measure of job openings misses something about true
establishment hiring effort. This ties in with the results of Davis, Faberman, and
Haltiwanger ð2013Þ, who report that around 40% of hires occur at establishments
that do not report any job openings to JOLTS. We return to this issue below in
Sec. V.
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phenomenon was more pronounced the smaller the establishment. During
the acute phase of the Great Recession, from the fall of 2008 onward, the
vacancy yield literally took off at establishments employing 1–9 workers.
At the largest establishments, however, the yield stopped rising. This sur-
prising set of facts is consistent with the collapse in hires of employed
workers, on which larger establishments rely more, but it can also be ex-
plained by tightening hiring standards by those large employers.
III. The Dynamic Job Ladder: Model
A. Flow Equations
In order to interpret the evidence laid out in Section II, we now propose
a turnover accounting framework. This is a reduced-form model of em-
ployment dynamics, a set of equilibrium predictions shared by several
models of the labor market with on-the-job search. Time t 5 0, 1, 2 . . . is
discrete. The labor market is populated by a unit measure of workers, who
can be either employed or unemployed, and by a unit measure of firms.
Workers agree on a ranking of employers, which gives rise to a job ladder.
Let x ∈ ½0; 1 be the rank of a firm in the job ladder: workers always prefer
firms with higher x. The labor market is affected by search frictions in that
unemployed workers can only sample job offers sequentially with prob-
ability lt ∈ ð0; 1Þ at time t. Employed workers draw each period with
probability s ∈ ð0; 1 an independent and identically distributed ði.i.d.Þ op-
FIG. 10.—Vacancy yields by establishment size class
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portunity to search on the job; thus they face a per-period sampling chance
of job offers of slt. Workers can only send one job application per period
and can never receive more than one offer in any period. Conditional on a
contact, workers draw offers from a sampling distribution with cumulative
distribution function Ftð·Þ, so FtðxÞ is the chance that the worker meets an
employer of rank below x. An employed worker is exogenously separated
from his employer and either, with probability dtðxÞ, enters unemploy-
ment, or, with probability rt, is immediately reallocated to another job,
drawn randomly from the available ones according to Ftð·Þ, without going
through unemployment. The displacement shock dtðxÞ encompasses both
layoffs and quits to nonemployment that result in a measurable unem-
ployment spell. The reallocation shock rt captures such events as moves
due to spousal relocation or displacements followed by immediate rehiring
by another employer. The objects that govern worker turnover, Ftð·Þ, dtð·Þ,
lt, and rt, are realizations of stochastic processes. We are particularly in-
terested in their business cycle fluctuations.
Let Ntð·Þ denote the cumulative distribution function of employment
over ranks at time t. So N0ðxÞ is the date-0 measure of employment at
firms of rank weakly below x, a given initial condition; NtðxÞ is the same
measure at time t; Ntð1Þ is total employment; and ut 5 1 2 Ntð1Þ is the
unemployment stock ðor rateÞ. Let
dt xð Þ5 1
Nt21 xð Þ E
x
0
dt qð ÞdNt21 qð Þ
denote the average transition rate into unemployment by workers cur-
rently at employers of rank up to x. Applying a Law of Large Numbers to
each firm rank and the definition of rank in a job ladder, we obtain equa-
tions for net and gross workers flows. We present the equations in terms
of employment cumulated over ranks,Nt. Taking derivatives with respect
to rank x would provide the equivalent equations at each x ðfor each em-
ployerÞ in the job ladder.
We start with gross flows, the inflow into ðoutflow fromÞ unemploy-
ment from ðintoÞ employers of rank below x:11
Employment to Nonemployment Flow:
EUt11 xð Þ5 dt11 xð ÞNt xð Þ:
ð1Þ
11 In the notation just laid out, we use the letter U to imply nonemployment. The
model is silent on any possible distinction between unemployment and nonem-
ployment. We will return to this issue momentarily.
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Nonemployment to Employment Flow:
UEt11 xð Þ5 lt11Ft11 xð Þ 12Nt 1ð Þ½ :
ð2Þ
In ð1Þ, the chance of exogenous separation dt11 xð Þ into unemployment
multiplies the measure of employed workers. In ð2Þ, the chance of job
contact times the chance that the contact is with a firm of rank below x
multiplies the measure of unemployed job searchers.
The third gross flow comprises workers who leave employers of rank
below x to join another employer of any rank. In turn, this flow includes
forced reallocations with chance rt 1 1 and voluntary quits:
Employment to Employment Flow ðQuitsÞ:
QEt11 xð Þ5 rt11Nt xð Þ1 slt11Ex
0
Ft11 x0ð ÞdNt x0ð Þ:
ð3Þ
To understand the integral term, note that a worker employed at rank x0 <
x receives each period with chance sl t11 an outside offer, which is above
rank x0 ðso the worker acceptsÞ with chanceFt11 x0ð Þ5 12 Ft11 x0ð Þ. A mea-
sure dNtðx0Þ of workers were initially employed at rank x0 < x. Here QE is
a gross outflow; some of these workers join other employers whose rank
is still below x, in some cases even below their current job’s rank if the
reallocation is forced.
The last gross flow is the inflow from other employers into firms of
rank at most x. By an accounting identity, given the three gross flows
above, this fourth one gives rise to net job creation by such firms. Since the
net flow is easier to measure empirically, we focus on the latter, so the
fourth gross flow is redundant. The net change in employment at firms
of rank up to x evolves as follows:
Nt11 xð Þ2Nt xð Þ5 2½dt11 xð Þ1 rt11 1 slt11Ft11 xð ÞNt xð Þ
1 frt11Nt 1ð Þ1 l t11½12Nt 1ð ÞgFt11 xð Þ:
ð4Þ
The first line includes outflow from firms of rank below x due to either
exogenous turnover, to unemployment dt11 xð Þ and other employers rt11,
or to outside offers received from firms of rank above x. The second line
includes the inflow into firms of rank below x, which are sampled with
probability Ft11ðxÞ either by workers who are forced-reallocated or by
the unemployed. Notice that the voluntary inflow from other employer
is omitted from the second line, because it can only occur from below x,
so it can at best reshuffle the mass of employment below x but not in-
crease it.
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To make equations ð1Þ–ð4Þ empirically operational, we need a measure
of job ladder rank. We do not observe the workers’ preferences that define
the job ladder, so we rely on their revealed preferences. Because workers
climb the job ladder, from lower-ranked to higher-ranked employers,
while the contact rates slt and the forced reallocation rate rt are rank-
independent, this turnover process makes higher-ranked firms also larger
in terms of employment measure. Thus, when given the opportunity, em-
ployed workers tend to move from smaller to larger employers. Exoge-
nous forced reallocations to unemployment and to other employers in-
terfere with this upgrading process and maintain a nondegenerate ergodic
size distribution of employers. In order to guarantee that higher rank
means larger size in the model, and thus to use firm size as an empirical
proxy for rank, we further assume that the inflow rate into unemployment
dtðxÞ is nonincreasing in rank x. This assumption encompasses as special
cases exogenous separations at flat, rank-independent probability dt, as
well as endogenous separations due tomatch-specific shocks, because work-
ers must be more reluctant to endogenously give up higher-ranked jobs if
they are more willing to accept them to begin with.We can then proceed to
estimate turnover rates from equations ð1Þ–ð4Þ using data on employment
stocks, net and gross worker flows, broken down by employer size. Before
doing so, we briefly discuss structural foundations of the dynamic job lad-
der, namely, of the accounting equations ð1Þ–ð4Þ, and how they relate to
the descriptive evidence illustrated earlier.
B. Structural Foundations
Equations ð1Þ–ð4Þ describe the accounting of worker flows in a job lad-
der, namely, in an environment where all workers agree on the ranking
of employers. This type of turnover process occurs in different frictional
models of the labor markets. The prime, but by no means only, example is
a wage-posting model. The canonical framework for the analysis of fric-
tional wage dispersion with on-the-job search is Burdett and Mortensen
ð1998Þ. This setup has strong implications also for worker turnover and
for the distribution of firm size, where a firm is identified by a wage policy
constrained to pay all workers the same. In particular, the unique steady
state equilibrium of the Burdett-Mortensen model features a job ladder by
employer size. In Moscarini and Postel-Vinay ð2009, 2013Þ, we introduce
aggregate uncertainty in the Burdett-Mortensen model and accordingly
identify a firm as a wage policy, which may now depend on the state of the
aggregate economy, the size of the firm, and the distribution of wage of-
fers by competitors.12 In the ergodic steady state of the stochastic econ-
omy, the unique equilibrium is always rank-preserving. That is, a firm that
12 This structural model does not, but can easily be extended to, include real-
location shocks with chance rt.
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is larger, and possibly permanently more productive, will always commit
to a stream of payments of higher value to workers, who then move on a
dynamic job ladder, from smaller, lower-paying to larger, high-paying
firms, at all points of the business cycle. Because larger firms pay more and
are ranked higher by workers, equilibrium preserves a stable ranking by
size, although not necessarily a stable size distribution, for any history of
aggregate shocks. In this model, firm-level productivity is a natural, al-
though by no means the only, primitive that determines the rank on the
ladder.
Coles and Mortensen ð2011Þ introduce idiosyncratic shocks to firm
productivity in a model that is very close to Moscarini and Postel-Vinay
ð2013Þ’s wage-posting framework and show the existence of a rank-
preserving equilibrium ðRPEÞ. In other business cycle models of frictional
labor markets with on-the-job search, workers agree in equilibrium on
the ranking of jobs ðmatchesÞ at each point in time. The allocation of jobs
to employers is somewhat indeterminate, but it can be chosen to generate
a dynamic job ladder and size distribution. Robin ð2011Þ introduces ag-
gregate uncertainty in Postel-Vinay and Robin ð2002Þ’s sequential auction
model of the labor market, where firms commit to wage offers but can
respond to outside offers to their employees. These models feature ran-
dom matching. Menzio and Shi ð2011Þ obtain a job ladder by wage with
aggregate shocks in a directed-search framework.
C. Revisiting the Descriptive Evidence
These structural models naturally dovetail with the stylized facts il-
lustrated in the previous section. Wages are increasing in employer size,
with causality running primarily from the former to the latter ðpaying
workers more attracts and retains more of themÞ but also in the opposite
direction. For example, in Moscarini and Postel-Vinay ð2013Þ, a larger
firm, under the equal-treatment constraint, is willing to pay its new hires
more than a smaller firm would, in order to pay more and retain its larger
existing labor force. A procyclical job contact rate lt and weakly coun-
tercyclical separation rate into unemployment dtð·Þ then imply that workers
climb the job ladder faster, and fall off the job/size ladder less often, in
expansions, and vice versa in recessions. Hence, both the extra net job cre-
ation and the employment share of larger employers, those that are located
higher on the ladder, are procyclical. Employer-to-employer transitions
are directed up the size ladder. Job ladder models are mostly silent on sep-
arations into unemployment, which are assumed exogenous. The cyclical-
ity of vacancy postings and hires by size are more difficult to discern qual-
itatively, and they require estimating the model, which is the objective of
the next section.
An important role in our analysis is played by reallocation shocks,
which move workers directly from employer to employer without any
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measurable unemployment spell. These shocks are meant to capture in the
data the sizable flows of workers who move in opposite directions among
employers of different sizes, a phenomenon that is inconsistent with the
idea of a job ladder in its most extreme form. One restriction imposed by
equation ð4Þ is that of a rank-independent chance rt of reallocation shocks.
Since employed workers voluntarily quit to accept an outside offer with
probability that decreases in the rank of their current employer, they all
move from job to job in the same direction ðup, toward larger employersÞ
on average, although not with probability one. This is a key prediction
that we will test. Another restriction is the rank-independent relative ef-
ficiency of employed and unemployed job search, s. This can be interpreted
as a time endowment available to all employed workers, no matter where
currently employed, to search and interview for other jobs. An alternative
interpretation, which would not be consistent with our assumptions, is that
workers control their job search effort, in which case we should expect s to
decline in rank x, as lower-ranked jobs, starting with unemployment at the
bottom of the ladder, are less desirable and motivate more search effort.
By assuming a constant s, we attribute all time-series variation in job
contact rates from employment to that in job market tightness and all
cross-sectional variation in turnover rates among workers to their different
positions on the job ladder: all workers receive offers at the same rate, but
they differ in their willingness to accept them. In the next section, we
investigate whether the job ladder hypothesis can be rejected, or, con-
versely, there exists a calibration of model objects such that the resulting
job ladder is consistent with gross worker flows by employer size each
month over a long time period.
IV. The Dynamic Job Ladder: Calibration
We calibrate the job ladder model using a minimum distance method.
Our target empirical moments are gross and net employment flows by
size class of the employer observed in JOLTS. Given our strong assump-
tions implying that employer size is a relevant rung of the job ladder, it is
far from obvious that the job ladder dynamic equations ð1Þ–ð4Þ can rep-
licate actual observations on gross and net flows, every month for 12 years,
for several size classes. Among many restrictions, our theory predicts that
smaller employers should lose a larger proportion of workers to job-to-
job quits. Testing all joint restrictions of the job ladder equation is our
main goal here. In addition to the parameter s ðthe search intensity of em-
ployed relative to unemployed workersÞ, equations ð1Þ–ð4Þ involve six time
series—dtðÞ, lt, rt, Ftð·Þ, Ntð·Þ, and the size of the labor force, which in
the model we normalized to one but which is time-varying in the data, or,
equivalently, the size of employment and unemployment, given the unem-
ployment rate 1 2 Ntð1Þ. We now explain how we map monthly empirical
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observations into our time series of interest. While some of them can be
estimated directly, we need the model to back up rt, Ftð·Þ, and s.
A. Size Ranks
Assuming for the time being that employer size is correctly measured
and that size does reflect rank in the job ladder ði.e., workers always prefer
larger employers when they can chooseÞ, establishments in a given JOLTS
size class k 5 1, 2, . . . , K will be representative of all establishments with
ranks between two unobserved cutoff values, x ∈ ½Xk21; Xk; with Xkf gKk51
an increasing sequence in ½0, 1, which remain fixed so long as the identities
of establishments assigned to size class k do not change. In JOLTS, each
month except at resampling dates, 1/12 of the surveyed establishments are
replaced with ex ante identical establishments, which had the same size and
industry at the time of sampling; under the assumption, underlying this
gradual rotation scheme, that these are statistically equivalent establish-
ments, we can effectively treat the identities and size class membership of
the JOLTS establishments as constant between resampling times.
The JOLTS sample thus provides observations at ðalmostÞ all dates of
cumulated employment NtðXkÞ, layoffs, and total quits ðand, potentially,
sampling probabilities FtðXkÞ—see belowÞ for K job ladder rank quantiles
Xkf gKk51 corresponding toK size classes.13 In what follows, we should keep
in mind that Xk is the cutoff quantile between size classes k and k 1 1.
With K size classes, this implies that XK ; 1. We will also use the conven-
tion X0 5 0. We now confront equations ð1Þ–ð3Þ with the JOLTS sample.
B. Separations into Nonemployment
As discussed earlier, a survey of employers like JOLTS reveals whether
a separation is a quit or a layoff from the viewpoint of the surveyed es-
tablishment. As workers are neither interviewed nor tracked after a sep-
aration, measured quits are the sum of quits to unemployment and quits
to other jobs, a distinction that is missing in the data but that is central to
the logic of the job ladder model, where the former are part of total sep-
arations into unemployment dt11 xð ÞNt xð Þ and the latter are upgrades. To
estimate dt11 xð Þ, we thus need some way to break down quits into those to
unemployment and those to other employers. To do so, we need worker-
side information.
Focusing first on the aggregate separation rate ðup to rank x 5 1Þ, we
seek to construct dt11 1ð Þ based on equation ð1Þ as the ratio between the
total monthly flow from employment to nonemployment and the total
13 As discussed earlier, the raw JOLTS sample has six establishment size classes:
1–9, 10–49, 50–249, 250–999, 1,000–4,999, and over 5,000 employees. For reasons
discussed earlier, we lump the largest two classes into one.
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stock of employment. The flow consists of layoffs plus quits into nonem-
ployment. We supplement the JOLTS data with the transition rates esti-
mated from the CPS by Fallick and Fleischman ð2004Þ, updated by the
authors through 2014. For every month t, we compute the share jCPSt of
total transitions that are employer-to-employer ðEEÞ, as opposed to tran-







All EE transitions are quits in the job ladder model; some are voluntary
upgrades, and others are forced reallocations. Assuming that the CPS-
based share jCPSt applies to the workers employed by the JOLTS sample of
establishments, we multiply total separations in JOLTS by 12 jCPSt to ob-
tain an estimate of aggregate separations into nonemployment, EUtð1Þ, that
is consistent with the JOLTS data. The corresponding aggregate separation
rate is then dt11 1ð Þ5 EUt 1ð Þ=Nt 1ð Þ.14
This procedure further gives us the share of all EU separations that are
quits. As mentioned earlier, JOLTS has a measure of total layoffs and
discharges, which we can subtract from our newly constructed time series
EUtð1Þ to obtain total quits into nonemployment in JOLTS. Subtracting
the latter from total quits, we obtain a JOLTS-based measure of quits to
other employers, or job-to-job outflow. We now introduce the ancillary—
yet economically meaningful—parameter wtðxÞ, defined as the share of to-
tal EU separations from employers of rank x that are quits to nonemploy-
ment, and
wt xð Þ5 1dt xð ÞNt21 xð Þ E
x
0
dt x0ð Þwt x0ð ÞdNt21 x0ð Þ;
the same share from employers of rank up to x. In this notation, wt11 1ð Þ is
the share of quits in aggregate separations into nonemployment, EUtð1Þ,
that we obtain from our procedure, the remaining share being layoffs. The
aggregate layoff probability is then dt11 1ð Þ 12 wt11 1ð Þ
 
, and the probabil-
ity of quitting into nonemployment is dt11 1ð Þ wt11 1ð Þ. Both of those, plus the
total aggregate transition rate into nonemployment dt11 1ð Þ, are plotted in
figure 11. While most of this figure has the familiar feature of a largely
14 To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first attempt to exploit information
from both the employer and the employee sides to draw empirically the distinction
between the three main types of separations: layoffs, quits to nonemployment, and
quits to other employers. Worker surveys such as the CPS and the SIPP are
notoriously plagued by noise in the layoff/quit distinction when the worker loses a
job. Administrative data sets do not typically contain information about the reason
for separation.
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acyclical probability of transition into nonemployment, the Great Reces-
sion stands out as a striking exception, with a sudden ðand short-livedÞ surge
in layoffs in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers
in September 2008.
The Fallick and Fleischman ð2004Þ series is only available at the ag-
gregate level. Therefore, making our quit/layoff distinction operational at
lower levels of size aggregation ðx < 1, which we shall need later in the
calibrationÞ requires additional assumptions. The identifying assumption
that we opt for here is that the probability with which workers quit into
nonemployment, wt11ðxÞdt11ðxÞ, is independent of their employer’s rank x.
That is to say, for all x, wt11 xð Þdt11 xð Þ; wt11 1ð Þdt11 1ð Þ. Since the total
separation rate into nonemployment dt11ðxÞ is nonincreasing in ðsizeÞ rank
x, this assumption implies that both total separation rates and layoff rates
are nonincreasing in x. Both implications hold in the JOLTS data.15 This
additional identifying assumption enables us to construct total separations
FIG. 11.—Average separation rate into nonemployment dt11 1ð Þ and its components
15 Any assumption we make at this point is necessarily arbitrary to some degree.
An alternative is to assume that the share of EU separations that are quits is in-
dependent of rank, i.e., that wt11 xð Þ; wt11 1ð Þ for all x. This implies that not only
the layoff rate but also the quit rate into nonemployment is decreasing in employer
size, or rank thereof. Results based on this alternative assumption, available upon
request, are qualitatively identical, and quantitatively very close, to the ones we
present here.
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into nonemployment from employers with rank up to Xk, namely,
dt11 Xkð ÞNt Xkð Þ, for all cutoff quantiles Xk corresponding to the JOLTS
size classes, as the sum of total layoffs from employers in size classes up
to k ðdirectly available from the JOLTS dataÞ, plus total quits into non-
employment from those employers, equal to wt11 1ð Þdt11 1ð ÞNt Xkð Þ by as-
sumption. Given observations on the cumulated employment distribution
Nt ðXkÞ, this allows us to directly estimate the desired total probability of
transition into nonemployment by size class, dt11 Xkð Þ.
C. Job Contact Probability
Equation ð4Þ applied to the top quantile x5 1 gives the law of motion of
aggregate employment:Nt11 1ð Þ5 12 dt11 1ð Þ
 
Nt 1ð Þ1 lt11Ut, whereUt5
12Ntð1Þ is nonemployment. From this equation, we can back out the job
finding rate from nonemployment, which is also the baseline job contact
rate:
lt11 5








Construction of lt11 from this equation thus requires knowledge of the
stock of nonemployed job seekers, Ut. Here again, we call on the Fallick
and Fleischman ð2004Þ CPS series, which offers a breakdown of the total
nonemployment to employment flow ðUEtð1Þ in our notationÞ into the
flow from unemployment into employment and the flow from inactivity
into employment. Taking the ðaverageÞ ratio of the latter to the former gives
us an estimate of the relative job finding rate of inactive workers to the
unemployed, say s0, so that the job finding probability of nonparticipants is
s0lt11. We then construct the effective pool of nonemployed job seekers as
Ut












where uCPSt is the CPS unemployment rate and e
CPS
t is the CPS employment-
population ratio. The value of s0 thus calibrated is 0.2, and the resulting job
finding rate series is plotted in figure 12. While it exhibits the familiar
cyclicality, including a vertiginous drop during the Great Recession, its
level is fairly low because it includes transitions to employment from
inactivity, which are a small fraction of the stock of inactive individuals.
D. Sampling Distribution and Employer-to-Employer Transitions
We now turn to the last, and arguably most salient, gross flow of work-
ers predicted by the job ladder, namely, job-to-job quits QEtðxÞ, given
in equation ð3Þ. We show how this equation, combined with the net
flow equation ð4Þ and with the JOLTS data, allows identification of the
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sampling distribution Ft11ð·Þ, the reallocation shock rt11, and the relative
intensity of employed search, s.
One easy option to estimate the sampling distribution Ft11ð·Þ would be
to set it equal to the observed distribution of job openings by size class,
which is readily available from JOLTS. However, the sampling distribu-
tion that is consistent with the model will only coincide with the empirical
distribution of job openings if ðaÞ job openings are measured accurately
in JOLTS and ðbÞ job opening counts are a good measure of actual hiring
effort ðin particular, all vacancies have equal samplingweightsÞ. Both of these
are questionable assumptions: for example, Davis et al. ð2013Þ have recently
forcefully argued that neither was true, especially at the low end of the es-
tablishment size distribution. Vacancies posted by different types of estab-
lishments may have different visibility or small establishments may rely
more on informal hiring channels rather than vacancies.
Luckily, the law of motion of employment in rank-preserving equi-
librium ðsee Sec. III.BÞ offers an alternative solution to estimate Ft11ð·Þ.
Equation ð4Þ defines the sampling distribution at cutoff quantiles Xk and
at all dates as
Ft11 Xkð Þ5
Nt11 1ð Þ2Nt11 Xkð Þ½ 2 12 rt11ð Þ Nt 1ð Þ2Nt Xkð Þ½ 1 dt11 1ð ÞNt 1ð Þ2 dt11 Xkð ÞNt Xkð Þ
rt11Nt 1ð Þ1 slt11Nt Xkð Þ1 lt11Ut
;
ð5Þ
FIG. 12.—Job finding rate lt11
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which we will use to estimate sampling probabilities Ftð·Þ, employed
search efficiency s, and reallocation shocks rt11, using the time series for
separation and accession probabilities dt11 Xkð Þ and lt11, and the stock of
nonemployment from CPS, Ut, all estimated as above, plus the stock of
employment NtðXkÞ in size classes up to k from JOLTS. Later we will
gauge how close the estimated sampling distribution from ð5Þ, which is
consistent with RPE employment dynamics by construction, is to the em-
pirical distribution of job openings across size classes.
Knowledge of the sampling distribution Ftð·Þ allows the construction of
total job-to-job quits in any size class k, which, following equation ð3Þ,
equal
QEt Xkð Þ2QEt Xk21ð Þ5 rt11 Nt Xkð Þ2Nt Xk21ð Þ½ 1 slt11EXk
Xk21
Ft11 xð ÞdNt xð Þ:
ð6Þ
The empirical counterpart is total quits in JOLTS size class k minus quits
into nonemployment from employers in that size class, which were esti-
mated in Subsection IV.B as ½wt11 1ð Þdt11 1ð Þ Nt Xkð Þ2Nt Xk21ð Þ½ . Fitting
ð6Þ to this JOLTS counterpart at each date t and size class k allows us, in
principle, to identify both the ðconstant across dates and classesÞ search
intensity of employed workers s and the ðconstant across classesÞ reallo-
cation shock rt.
This last statement must be qualified as follows. First, in order to limit
the computational cost of this calibration and to attain more precise iden-
tification, we further restrict the reallocation probability rt to equal a con-
stant ðrÞ times the baseline job finding rate lt. While not strictly necessary,
this restriction considerably reduces the number of parameters to esti-
mate, from one value of rt for each month in the sample ð140 in totalÞ
down to a single scalar, r. This restriction follows, for example, if r is the
probability that the worker’s spouse is seeking a better job that would
require the entire household to move, a job search that is successful with
probability lt. Second, equation ð6Þ is not exactly implementable, as the
transformed net flow equation ð5Þ only gives the sampling distribution at
the cutoff quantiles Xk, whereas in principle we would need it over its en-
tire support to calculate the integral in equation ð6Þ. We approximate the




So far we assumed that an establishment’s size, as measured in JOLTS,
is the “relevant” measure of size, in the sense that it reflects the relevant
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rank of that establishment. There are at least two reasons to doubt that this
is always the case. The first one is random fluctuations in establishment
size. While the job ladder model uses a large-number approximation and
treats establishment size as evolving deterministically over time, in reality
establishment size will fluctuate randomly around the mean value pre-
dicted by the job ladder. If, at the time of JOLTS resampling, an estab-
lishment has an exceptionally high ðsayÞ realization of the random com-
ponent of its size, that establishment may be assigned to the “wrong” size
class, that is, to a size class that reflects its transitory larger size rather than
its long-run smaller size. This will be especially true of smaller establish-
ments, both because the large-number approximation is less accurate for
a small establishment and also because the small-size classes ð1–9 and 10–
49 employeesÞ are narrower than the larger ones, even in logs.16
The second reason to suspect that establishment size does not perfectly
reflect the relevant rank in the ladder is that many establishments are part
of multi-establishment firms. Depending on the degree of decentralization
and devolution in the parent firm’s management, the relevant rank for
those establishments may be at the level of the parent firm, in which case
the size measure that will best reflect rank is not the size of the estab-
lishment but that of the parent firm, which we do not observe in JOLTS.
Indeed, in Moscarini and Postel-Vinay ð2012Þ, we document from the US
Census’ Business Dynamics Statistics that the average size of an estab-
lishment first grows with the size of the parent company but levels at
about 60 employees when the size of the firm reaches 250 and is still about
60 workers per establishment at firms employing over 10,000 workers in
total. So very large firms own hundreds or even thousands of separate,
relatively small establishments ðnational banks and retailers come to mindÞ,
whose workers benefit from the productivity and compensation policy of
the parent company.17
16 Mean-reverting innovations in establishment size are easily detected by the
size/growth relationship. While growth in an establishment’s employment is strongly
decreasing in its beginning-of-period size, it is nearly uncorrelated with the average
size of the same establishment over the same period. Hence, Gibrat’s Law holds ap-
proximately, and the negative size/growth relationship originates from a classic re-
gression to the mean fallacy, with the possible modest exception of very small es-
tablishments.
17 In his discussion of our paper, using administrative data Integreret Database
for Arbejdsmarkedsforskning ðIntegrated database for labor market research, IDAÞ
from Denmark, Rasmus Lentz reported that the variation of wages across the
establishments of a typical firm, although not zero, is substantially lower than in
the population of establishments as a whole. The variation of establishment size,
on the other hand, is almost as large within a firm as in the wider population of
establishments. We thank Lentz for pointing out this evidence, which speaks to the
misclassification issue.
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For both reasons, observed size classes in JOLTS and true rungs on the
job ladder may not coincide. We propose to tackle those two issues and to
reconcile size and rank classes by modeling misclassification explicitly. To
avoid any confusion, we now introduce a distinction between size class k,
defined based on the JOLTS sample as the set of establishments whose
observed size falls between two given cutoff values ðe.g., 50–249 employ-
eesÞ, and rank class k, defined as the set of establishments whose unob-
served rank on the job ladder falls within the quantile interval ½Xk21, Xk.
2. Modeling Misclassification
Consider an establishment with job ladder rank x, whose “true” ðor
model-predictedÞ size at date t is ‘t xð Þ. We assume that this establish-
ment’s observed size is the true size ,tðx0Þ of an establishment with rank x0
drawn at random from some conditional.
3. Size Classes with Misclassification
Next consider size classes. We can define size class k as the set of all
establishments whose observed size ‘o falls within some interval ‘ðXk21Þ;½
‘ðXkÞ. Observed employment in size class k is, therefore,
nokt 5 E1
0
mk xð Þ‘t xð Þdx; ð7Þ
wheremkðxÞ5M Xk j xð Þ2M Xk21 j xð Þ for all x ∈ ½0; 1 is the probability
of an establishment of rank x being observed as belonging to size class k.
To gain some tractability and amenability to calibration, we further re-
strict misclassification weights mkðxÞ to be constant within rank classes,





where nkt 5Nt Xkð Þ2Nt Xk21ð Þ is true employment in rank class k.

























CCA ≔ Mnt; ð8Þ
18 This is necessarily an approximation, as the boundaries of size classes in terms
of productivity, the Xk’s, are likely to change at each JOLTS resampling date.
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which in turn implies that “true” employment in rank class k can be in-
ferred from observed employment in size class k as nt 5M21 not . Misclas-
sification weights mkjk0 ðthe entries of the matrixMÞ are unknown and are
added to the set of parameters to calibrate.19
4. Measurement Equations with Misclassification
The transition rates lt; dt 1ð Þ are estimated only off aggregate magni-
tudes and are not sensitive to size misclassification. With our assumption
of a rank-independent probability of quitting into nonemployment, nei-
ther is said probability ð wt 1ð Þdt 1ð ÞÞ. Misclassification, however, does affect
observed job-to-job quits from establishments in class k. To see how, note
that observed total quits, to nonemployment and to other jobs, from
employers in rank class k are
Qokt 5 E1
0
wt11 1ð Þdt11 1ð Þ1 rt11 1 slt11Ft11 xð Þ
 
mk xð ÞdNt xð Þ:
Under the assumption of constant misclassification weights in each rank
class and over time, the expression for total observed quits from class k
becomes
Qokt 5


























wt11 1ð Þdt11 1ð Þ1 rt11
 
nokt:
Dividingby employment in rank classk andusingnt 5M21not , we thus obtain
slt11EXk
Xk21






19 Note that, by construction, oKk51mkjk0 5 1 for all k0.
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This equation highlights the importance of introducing misclassification in
our JOLTS data. The left-hand side of ð9Þ is the conditional expectation of
Ft11 xð Þ within rank class k; the right-hand side is a measure of the rate of job-
to-job quits from the size class that are motivated by better offers. The job
ladder model predicts unambiguously that both sides of the equation should
be decreasing in size class k: larger employers are ranked higher and have an
easier time retaining employees. Because wt11 1ð Þdt11 1ð Þ1 rt11 is constant
across size classes k, this requires total quits to decline in k. In the JOLTS
data by establishment size, which is split into six size classes, the observed
quit rate,Qokt=n
o
kt actually increases between size classes k5 1 and k5 2 in
all months and often during the sample period also between k5 2 and k5
3. We reconcile some of these observations with the job ladder by allowing
some of the small establishments to be part of very large firms.
F. Implementation: Summary
For given reallocation shock arrival rate rlt, search efficiency s, and mis-
classification weightsM, using observations on employment stocks and to-
tal quits by size class, we can calculate Q*kt and the cumulated sampling
probabilities at size cutoffs Ft Xkð Þ from equation ð5Þ ðusing nt 5M21not Þ.
We then look for values of rt, s, andM that minimize the distance between
both sides of ð9Þ over the entire sample period.20 Therefore, by construc-
tion, the only worker flow that our model can fail to replicate exactly are
job-to-job quits by size of the current employer. This final stage of our
calibration protocol thus uses 3K 1 2 parameters ðthe 3K independent
entries ofM plus r and sÞ to match a number of moments which is equal to
K times the number of months in our sample ðthe Kmoments in ½9 in each
monthÞ. With K 5 4 size classes, this adds up to 14 parameters and 560
moments.
V. Results
We find that no sensible misclassification scheme can easily remedy the
basic fact that the total quit rate, to nonemployment and to other estab-
lishments, originating from the smallest establishment size class in JOLTS,
“1–9 employees,” is significantly lower than that from the second-largest
class, “10–49 employees.” In the data, it appears that a large group of small
establishments have unexpectedly ðbased on the job ladder modelÞ low
rates of attrition; therefore, their size is not an accurate reflection of their
rank or desirability. The reason may be that small employers are largely
20 In so doing, we add a penalty term to the criterion that we minimize ðthe
norm of the difference between the two sides of ½9Þ to avoid large values of rt that
would imply negative corrected net quits Q*kt at some dates for the highest pro-
ductivity class K.
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of a different nature than larger ones and more likely to “break ranks”
and not comply with the job ladder. For example, these small establish-
ments may be young and growing and not have joined yet their long-run
size class.21 At the other end, the largest class of establishments with more
than 5,000 employees has a very small sample size in JOLTS and is there-
fore somewhat noisy.
For both reasons, to calibrate the model we aggregate size of JOLTS
establishments into K 5 four classes: 1–49, 50–249, 250–999, and at least
1,000 employees. This partition, albeit coarser, still allows for significant
heterogeneity and can be fitted quite well by the job ladder model. While
we acknowledge the simple job ladder model’s inability to accurately de-
scribe quits at the lower end of the size distribution as an unambiguous
failure of the model, we still argue that this model, given its parsimony,
does a remarkable job of simultaneously fitting the level and cyclicality of
both gross and net unemployment flows by four very different size classes.
A. Calibration Results
Estimates of the various rates of separation into nonemployment and of
the job finding rate were already shown in Subsections IV.B and IV.C,
respectively. Here we report estimates of the remaining scalar parameters,
namely, the relative intensity of reallocation shocks r 5 rt/lt and search
by employed workers s, and the conversion matrix M, that is, the mis-
classification weights mkjk0 , ðk; k0Þ ∈ f1; : : : ;Kg2: All those values are
gathered in tables 1 and 2.
The misclassification weights in table 2 suggest that high-rank estab-
lishments ðfrom class K 5 4Þ have the largest ð.65Þ probability of being
misclassified, and they are almost always mistaken for establishments
from size class 1 ð1–49 employeesÞ. Apart from rank class 4, the estimated
conversion matrix M has most of its weight on the diagonal, suggesting
that misclassification is less of an issue for low to intermediate rank lev-
els ðclasses k 5 1–3Þ. This finding is consistent with an interpretation of
misclassification as arising primarily from the establishment/firm distinc-
tion, as some very productive—and large—firms are split into many small
establishments, very often no larger than 50 employees. The calibrated ma-
trix M places some small weight on the subdiagonal, meaning that some
establishments are actually seen as larger than their productivity would
warrant under the job ladder assumption. We interpret this as a conse-
quence of transitory noise or measurement error in establishment size:
21 As a manifestation of a similar phenomenon in the Danish matched employer-
employee data set IDA, the wage-size relationship is monotonically increasing
except at the very beginning, as very small firms pay higher wages than slightly
larger ones. We thank our discussant, Lentz, for pointing out this parallel.
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for example, an establishment whose long-run size is, say, 248 ðand thus
would normally belong to size class 2Þ, can temporarily be seen reaching
a size slightly above 250 and thus be misclassified into size class 3 ðrecall
that JOLTS assigns establishments to size classes according to the largest
size achieved over the 12 months prior to samplingÞ.22
The relative search intensity of employed workers is calibrated at s 5
0.203, a value that is in the region of typical estimates based on worker
microdata. This puts the sample mean monthly probability of receiving an
outside offer to 0.03. Finally, the reallocation shock intensity is estimated
to equal r 5 0.0145. This value may seem small when compared, for in-
stance, to the value of s; however, it still implies that the share of EE tran-
sitions that are forced reallocations ðas opposed to voluntary transitionsÞ
is about a half ð49.7% on averageÞ. This share is calculated as the sample
mean of
rltNt 1ð Þ
rltNt 1ð Þ1 sltE10 Ft xð ÞdNt xð Þ
:
The relatively large value of this share, given the relatively high odds of re-




r .0145 Sample mean of rlt 5 .0021
s .2034 Sample mean of slt 5 .0300
Table 2
Estimated Misclassiﬁcation Weights M
Job Ladder Rank Class k
Establishment Size Range 1 2 3 4
1–49 .977 .000 .000 .651
50–249 .023 .846 .000 .000
250–999 .000 .154 1.000 .000
1,000 plus .000 .000 .000 .349
22 To adhere more strictly to the large firms/small establishments interpretation,
we can also calibrate the model imposing that M be upper-triangular. Imposing
this constraint only affects the model fit very marginally, and it produces visually
identical results ðavailable upon requestÞ.
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indicates that many offers are rejected by employed workers. This, in turn,
is a consequence of the fact that the sampling distribution Ft ð·Þ is skewed
toward the lower end of its support. We now turn to the analysis of that
distribution and the corresponding EE quit patterns.
B. Establishment Sampling Probabilities and Quit Patterns
Figure 13 plots the right-hand side of ð9Þ, namely, the estimated values
of slt11Ft11 Xkð Þ, for k 5 1, . . . , 4 ðsolid linesÞ, together with the left-hand
side of ð9Þ, Q*kt=nkt ðdashed linesÞ, thus offering a pictorial assessment of
the job ladder’s capacity to fit the quit patterns by establishment size ob-
served in the JOLTS sample. Figure 14 further plots the estimated sam-
pling cumulative distribution function Ft ðXkÞ for k 5 1, . . . , 4 ðsolid
linesÞ, together with F JOLTSt ðXkÞ ðdashed linesÞ, the empirical cumulative
distribution function of job openings, directly taken from the JOLTS data,
corrected for misclassification using the probabilities and weights, as ex-
plained earlier in this section. The vertical dotted lines in figure 14 indicate
JOLTS resampling dates.
We can see in figure 13 that our calibration ensures that the sampling
distribution constructed by fitting the RPE dynamic equation ð5Þ to net
employment flow data from JOLTS is by and large consistent with the
gross flow data on job-to-job quits by establishment size over the period
covered by JOLTS. Although the data exhibit a slight downward trend in
the job-to-job quit rates of the highest two rank classes ð3 and 4Þ, which
FIG. 13.—Rate of voluntary employer-to-employer quit. The Data series are
corrected for misclassification.
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the model fails to fully capture, we still conclude that the model, including
its correction for the misclassification of employers into size classes, offers
a remarkably good description of these data, especially considering its
parsimony. In particular, EE transition rates, once corrected for mis-
classification, are indeed neatly ordered by rank class, as predicted by the
job ladder model. We stress that this outcome was not at all guaranteed
ex ante.
A further striking lesson from figure 13 is that job-to-job exit rates from
all but the highest rank class declined sharply during the Great Recession,
especially at the lower end, and they remained low thereafter. Again, our
simple job ladder model captures this pattern well, albeit with a slight lag
for the lowest rank class, k 5 1. This is one of our central findings: the
Great Recession was a time when job-to-job quit rates declined sharply,
not only in the aggregate, as was already known, but especially from
smaller, less productive employers. Because these are always the main
source of job-to-job reallocation, we conclude that workers almost stopped
climbing the job ladder during the Great Recession and the recovery was
almost absent.
Looking more closely at the calibrated sampling distribution ðfig. 14Þ, we
first see that the empirical distribution of job openings, F JOLTSt ð·Þ, vastly un-
derestimates our calibrated Ft ð·Þ for all rank classes, but more severely so at
the lower end of the job ladder. This is ðqualitativelyÞ consistent with the
findings of Davis et al. ð2013Þ, who report that 41.6% of all hires occur at
FIG. 14.—The sampling distribution
S88 Moscarini/Postel-Vinay
This content downloaded from 128.041.035.146 on October 27, 2017 07:08:29 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
establishments with zero posted job opening in the microdata underlying
JOLTS, with that proportion ranging from 76.9% for the small JOLTS
size class down to roughly 7% for our largest size class. Second, there is a
very slight upward time trend in the sampling distribution at all cutoff
points Xk.
23 This is consistent with the empirical observation that the
average size of US establishments has declined over recent decades, while
that of the average firm has increased, so misclassification in the sense that
affects our data has arguably become worse.
Finally, figure 15 shows the model counterpart of what we called aver-
age vacancy weights in our description of the data ðSec. IIÞ, that is, the
sampling probabilities divided by the number of employers in each class,24
normalized to one in January 2001 to harmonize scales. This is a measure
of hiring effort by each employer per size class relative to the aggregate
hiring effort. We can clearly see that, as the financial crisis unfolded, hiring
effort by each employer rose in relative terms at the bottom of the size of
the distribution and fell at the top. This is a symptom of a failing job
ladder by employer size. Comparing figure 15 to its empirical counterpart
FIG. 15.—Calibrated average class vacancy weights, normalized 01/2001 5 1
23 A linear time trend is found to be positive and statistically significant for all k
in both FtðXkÞ and F JOLTSt Xkð Þ.
24 Consistent with our procedure to correct for misclassification, we use the
number of establishments in each size class in QCEW, corrected for misclassifi-
cation using the conversion matrixM, as our measure of the number of employers
in each size class.
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based on JOLTS vacancies ðfig. 9Þ, we see that our sampling weights are
estimated to differ at the top of the size distribution from the JOLTS
vacancy weights. In this sense, the model provides an important filter to
the data.
C. Discussion
We now take stock of our results. Figure 15 indicates that, during both
the 2001 recession and the first half of the 2008 recession, the vacancy
weights and sampling probabilities of high-rank employers increased, while
those of low-rank employers stayed flat or even declined. This fact in it-
self is striking in the light of Moscarini and Postel-Vinay ð2012Þ’s finding
that recessions are typically times when small ðor low-rankÞ employers are
growing relative to large ones. It also suggests that the vacancy yield of
small employers must have increased by much more than that of large ones
during those recessions, a hypothesis that finds some support in the raw
data ðfig. 10Þ. Perhaps even more striking is the sudden reversal of this pat-
tern at the end of 2008, immediately after the Lehman Brothers episode: at
that point, the sampling probability of the high-rank class collapsed, while
that of the lowest-rank class soared, in relative terms. This, combined with
a very low baseline job finding rate lt ðfig. 12Þ, suggests that at that point
high-rank firms froze their demand for new labor and that whatever little
hiring took place happened at the lower-rank end of the population of
employers. This is indeed what we observe when examining JOLTS hire
rates by employer size after reclassifications. Even more than in the raw
data ðfig. 2Þ, hire rates rise sharply and temporarily at the lower end of the
size distribution, while upgrading to better jobs slows down considerably,
as evidenced by the durably low EE quit rates that ensued ðfig. 13Þ. In
short, the job ladder failed, starting from the upper rungs.
Reclassification does not change, and if anything it reinforces, the qual-
itative time-series pattern of layoffs by establishment size that we found
in the raw data ðfig. 3Þ. Layoffs significantly contributed to the increase in
unemployment during the Great Recession, but the persistence of high
unemployment in the 4 years after the end of the Great Recession is en-
tirely accounted for by the failure of job finding rates to recover and the
persistent increase in unemployment duration. After reclassifying estab-
lishments into rank classes so as to fit the job ladder model, the spike in
layoff rates is much sharper among low-rank employers. The contem-
poraneous shift in sampling weights toward the bottom of the size dis-
tribution that we documented earlier suggests that the employers that were
least affected by the Great Recession, especially after September 2008, took
advantage of rising unemployment to hire. Because in the job ladder model
each low-rank employer is more dependent on the reservoir of unem-
ployed, it responded more, that is, cut its vacancies by less. In addition,
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recall that the job ladder has a hard time fitting the raw data at the very low
end of the size distribution, as quit rates from very small establishments are
low relative to those in the two subsequent size classes. This observation
suggests very significant heterogeneity among small establishments. Some
are small because they are unproductive. Others are temporarily small but
are very productive and attractive because they are still growing. Indeed,
Fort et al. ð2013Þ draw a sharp distinction between the cyclical dynamics of
net employment growth at young and old small firms in US Census data
that break down net employment flows by age and size but lack infor-
mation on gross workers flows. So it appears that the small class as a whole
shed much more employment by actively laying workers off but that it
also hired more by taking advantage of high unemployment and the dy-
namism of young employers.
To summarize: during the Great Recession all employers temporarily
raised their layoff rates, experienced slower attrition, and reduced their
vacancy postings and hire rates; small employers laid off more and simul-
taneously reduced less their hiring effort, even hired more, but also ex-
perienced more of the decline in job-to-job quits, because hiring effort and
hires at the top almost vanished; the job ladder slowed down at the bottom
and almost stopped at the top. We can briefly speculate on the reasons be-
hind these events. One distinguishing feature of the Great Recession rel-
ative to previous recessions was the credit crunch in late 2008 and early
2009. Our evidence is consistent with a credit crunch that affected more
existing businesses, particularly the older and less productive ones, than
new entrants and young growing but still small businesses. After the fi-
nancial crisis exploded in fall 2008, businesses, especially small ones, had a
hard time finding and renewing working capital to cover payroll at the end
of each month, while attrition through quits to other employers and non-
employment collapsed, so employers had to actively reduce their work-
force through layoffs. The contemporaneous reduction in vacancy post-
ings that affected disproportionately large employers does not support
more traditional theories of credit constraints, where firms, especially small
ones, have a hard time securing new financing to invest and create new jobs.
VI. Conclusions
We study labor reallocation, both through unemployment and directly
from job to job, across employers of different productivities. We focus on
the US economy around the Great Recession. In order to impose structure
on our empirical investigation, we formulate a dynamic job ladder model,
where employers that are ranked more highly by workers, for example,
because they are higher paying, spend more hiring effort and, conditional
on contacting another worker, are more likely to succeed in hiring. As a
consequence, an employer’s size is a relevant proxy for rank. We use newly
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available monthly time series from JOLTS on employment net and gross
flows by size of the establishment. We find that our parsimonious turn-
over model of a dynamic job ladder fits the facts well and that it implies
“true” vacancy postings by size that are more in line with gross flows and
intuition than JOLTS’ measures of vacancies, previously criticized by
other authors. Our main finding is that the job ladder stopped working in
the Great Recession and is yet to fully resume. Job-to-job quits, especially
from the bottom of the size/rank distribution, collapsed, further reduc-
ing voluntary attrition and thus the incentives of small employers to post
vacancies and to hire unemployed workers.
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